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Abstract In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77–
99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks’ profits to the detriment of
creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and
poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case in which adverse selection is not too
strong. We analyze the complementary case and show that, when the economy suffers
from strong adverse selection, information sharing still increases banks’ profits, but it
may or may not hurt talented entrepreneurs.
Keywords Information sharing · Lending relationships · Poaching ·
Equilibrium switching
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1 Introduction
In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) (henceforth G&S) show that
the sharing of information in credit markets increases banks’ equilibrium profits at
the expense of talented entrepreneurs in a duopoly with switching costs and poaching.
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G&S restrict their attention to the case in which adverse selection is not too strong,
meaning that the proportion of talented entrepreneurs is sufficiently large.
In this paper we extend their analysis to the complementary case of strong adverse
selection. We find that information sharing continues to lead to higher banks’ prof-
its—for the same reasons that G&S explain—but it may hurt or benefit talented entre-
preneurs.
In both G&S and the current paper, information sharing has the potential to increase
welfare because the information provided by a rival bank about its customers allows a
bank to reduce the costs that arise when the bank tries to attract its rival’s customers. In
particular, a bank can reduce the financing costs from providing capital (in the second
period) to projects known by its rival to be unproductive. Moreover, when the infor-
mation provided by a rival leads a bank to change the offers that it makes to this rival’s
customers, the set of consumers that switch banks and the resulting overall switching
costs may also change.
In their analysis of the mild adverse selection case, G&S find that information shar-
ing allows a bank to refrain from lending to its rival’s untalented customers, but that the
gains from not financing these unproductive projects are invalidated by softer compe-
tition in the first period: information sharing induces the banking profits to increase by
more than the cost savings in lending, because information sharing also relaxes price
competition in period 1. Thus, information sharing also adds a strategic component
to bank profits, which ultimately represents a transfer from talented entrepreneurs to
banks (Gehrig and Stenbacka 2007, p. 90).
Here we find that in the complementary situation of strong adverse selection (i.e., of
a low proportion of creditworthy entrepreneurs) there are two distinct cases to consider
with respect to the potential welfare-enhancing effects of information sharing.
1. When the proportion of talented entrepreneurs is very low (the meaning of “very
low” will become clear below), in the absence of information sharing a bank
does not make any offer to its rival’s customers (there is no poaching) and, there-
fore, there is no financing of projects of unknown quality. Since there are neither
unproductive projects being financed nor customers switching banks, the potential
gains from information sharing disappear. By relaxing competition in the initial
period, information sharing increases banks’ profits to the detriment of talented
entrepreneurs.
2. When the proportion of talented entrepreneurs is moderately low, in the absence
of information sharing banks make some poaching offers and finance some unpro-
ductive projects (there is randomized poaching). In this case, the sharing of infor-
mation reduces thefinancing costs resulting fromproviding capital to unproductive
projects as well as switching costs. We find that the size of these gains may or may
not outweigh the increase in banks’ profits due to the softening of competition in
the first period and, therefore, the final outcome is that information sharing may
hurt or benefit talented entrepreneurs.
The rest of our exposition is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes themodel.
Section 3 derives the equilibriumwhen there is no information sharing. Section 4 deals
with the changes that occur when banks agree to share information, by comparing the
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equilibrium under information sharing derived in G&Swith the equilibrium in Sect. 3.
Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model in G&S can be described as follows. There are two periods, t = 1 and 2,
two banks, A and B, and two types of entrepreneurs (or borrowers), talented and
untalented. In each period, entrepreneurs have access to projects that require borrow-
ing from banks one unit of capital, with opportunity cost R0. Talented entrepreneurs
undertake projects that yield a positive return, v, with probabilityπ and zero otherwise,
while untalented entrepreneurs’ projects always yield zero. It is common knowledge
that a proportion λ of entrepreneurs are talented. At the beginning of period one, banks
compete for borrowers of unknown type by setting one-period (gross) interest rates
Ri1, i = A, B. Upon observing these interest rates, borrowers choose one bank. After
this, investments are carried out, returns are obtained, repayments are made, and banks
learn the types of their own customers. Since entrepreneurs are protected by limited
liability, they default—and repay nothing to the banks—when realized returns are zero
which occurs when, either the entrepreneur is untalented or the project of a talented
entrepreneur becomes unsuccessful.
In period two, competition between banks can take place under two different infor-
mation structures, with and without information sharing. In the first case, both banks
will know all the borrowers’ types. In contrast, in the absence of information sharing,
each bank will know its borrowers’ types but it will not know the types of its rival’s
borrowers. In either case, a bank’s willingness to make a loan to a particular borrower,
as well as the interest rate on such a loan, may depend on this borrower’s previous
history. A bank will (not) make an offer to an entrepreneur if the bank has learned
that this entrepreneur is (un)talented, and it may or may not make an offer to a rival’s
unknown first-period customer. If bank i offers to make a loan to a customer in period
two, the (gross) interest rate on this loan will be Ri2 if this customer is bank i’s previous
borrower and Qi2 if it is not. Borrowers choose again one of the banks. If they choose
to switch banks, they will incur an idiosyncratic switching cost b, which is drawn from
a uniform distribution on the interval [0, b]. Borrowers privately learn the realization
of b at the beginning of the second period, before making their choice. Finally, sec-
ond-period investments are carried out, returns are obtained and repayments are made.
We derive now the equilibria in the different set-ups.
3 Equilibrium without information sharing
3.1 Equilibrium in period 2
In their paper, G&S consider a situation with a high proportion of talented entrepre-
neurs (λ ≥ 9R0/(9R0+b¯)). They show that in such a case it is a symmetric equilibrium
that each bank i (i = A, B) offers a rate Ri2 = (2b¯ + 3R0)/3π to its own talented
customers and a poaching rate Qi2 = (b¯ + 3R0)/3π to its rival’s customers.
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G&S implicitly assume that these equilibrium rates are no higher than the return v,
which is equivalent to assuming 2b¯ ≤ 3(πv − R0): the net present value of the project
of a talented entrepreneur is large in relation to switching costs. The equilibrium rates
imply that the poaching profits for bank i on bank j’s customers are:
(1 − μi )(λb¯/9 − (1 − λ)R0) (1)
where μi is bank i’s first-period market share. These poaching profits will be negative
if the proportion of talented entrepreneurs is small, which corresponds to the following
condition:
λ < R0/(R0 + b¯/9) (2)
G&S focus their attention on the case in which the condition (2) does not hold and,
therefore, the poaching profits in (1) are positive. In contrast, we concentrate on the
complementary situation where condition (2) is satisfied. We say that there is strong
adverse selection if this condition holds. In such a situation, we can distinguish two
different cases. In the first case, there is a symmetric equilibrium where each bank
i refrains from making poaching offers to its rival bank’s customers and—expecting
no poaching offers from the rival bank—offers rates as high as possible (Ri2 = v) to
its own talented customers. In the second case, these strategies are not equilibrium
strategies.1 The reason is that even though, given that the rival bank j does not make
any poaching offer, the rate Ri2 = v maximizes bank i’s profits on its own custom-
ers, μiλ(π Ri2 − R0), bank i is able to obtain positive poaching profits on its rival’s
first-period costumers when the rival sets R j2 = v. In this second case, there is no
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in which banks do not offer any poaching
rate and we have to rely on mixed-strategy equilibria. We look for an equilibrium in
which each bank i offers the rate Ri2 to its own customers and randomizes between
making a poaching offer Qi2 to the rival bank’s customers and refraining from making
any poaching offer at all. To ensure the existence of equilibrium whenever there is
strong adverse selection, either in pure or mixed strategies, we restrict attention to the
case (9/8)(πv − R0) ≤ 2b¯. Since we keep the assumption 2b¯ ≤ 3(πv − R0) implicit
in G&S, we assume that
(9/8)(πv − R0) ≤ 2b¯ ≤ 3(πv − R0) (3)
In the following proposition we characterize the second-period equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 (Equilibrium in period 2) Assume that there is no information shar-
ing, condition (3) holds, and there is strong adverse selection (λ < R0/(R0 + b¯/9)).
Let λ∗ = 4b¯R0/(4b¯R0 + (πv − R0)2).
(a) If λ < λ∗ , bank i (i = A, B) will make no offer to the rival bank’s first-period
customers, and an offer Ri2 = v to its own talented customers, leading to sec-
ond-period profits Gi2 = μiλ(πv − R0).
1 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this fact.
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(b) If λ∗ < λ < R0/(R0 + b¯/9), bank i (i = A, B) will make an offer Ri2 =
(3αR0 + 2b¯)/(3απ) to its own talented customers, and it will make an offer
Qi2 = (3αR0 + b¯)/(3απ)to the rival bank’s first-period customers with proba-
bility α, and no offer with probability (1 − α), being α = (λb¯/9(1 − λ)R0)1/2.
All this leads to second-period equilibrium profits, Gi2 = μiλ(4b¯/9α).
Proof See Appendix.
Remark λ∗ < R0/(R0 + b¯/9) if and only if 2b¯ < 3(πv − R0).
It is worth emphasizing that banks obtain no profits from poaching their rival’s cus-
tomers because, either they refrain from making poaching offers at all or they make
such offers with probability α < 1. Thus, they are indifferent between making these
offers and refraining from doing so.
3.2 Equilibrium in period 1
Bank i ′s inter-temporal discounted profits are Gi = Gi1 + δGi2, where δ denotes the
common discount factor and Gi1 the first-period profits, which are given by:
Gi1 = μi [λπ Ri1 − R0] (4)
The combination of strong adverse selection and no information sharing creates a
protected second-period market, where each bank obtains high profits on their initial
customers and is unable to obtain any profits by poaching its rival’s previous cus-
tomers. The following proposition tells us that the anticipation of this second-period
configuration leads banks to such an intense competition to attract customers in the
first-period that banks’ overall profits vanish.
Proposition 3.2 (Equilibrium in period 1) Assume that condition (3) holds, there is
strong adverse selection (λ < R0/(R0+b¯/9)) and no information sharing. Then, bank
i (i = A, B) obtains overall profits Gi =0 and sets (a) Ri1 = [R0 − δλ(πv − R0)]/λπ
if λ < λ∗ and (b) Ri1 = [R0 − δλ(4b¯/9α)]/λπ if λ > λ∗.
Proof See Appendix.
It is also important for future reference to calculate the talented entrepreneurs’ expected
sum of debt repayments and switching costs, TC:
TC = R0[(1/λ)] if λ < λ∗
R0[(1/λ) + δ + δα(1 − λ)/λ] + δ b¯/18α if λ > λ∗ (5)
If λ < λ∗ firms never switch banks, which implies that they do not incur in any
switching costs and TC consists solely in debt repayments, T C = π Ri1 + δπ Ri2,
which results in Eq. (5) after replacing Ri1 in Proposition 3.2 and R
i
2 in Proposition
3.1. In this case, TC is equal to the repayments that reach a break-even point, taking
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into account that the banks finance untalented entrepreneurs in the first period but not
in the second one.
If λ > λ∗, firms receive an offer to switch banks with probability α and, therefore,
T C = π Ri1 + δαE min[π Ri2, π Q j2 + b] + δ(1 − α)π Ri2.
Now, since E min[π Ri2, Q j2 + b] =
∫ π(Ri2−Q j2)
0 [π Q j2 + b](1/b¯)db +
∫ b¯
π(Ri2−Q j2)
π Ri2(1/b¯)db,we obtain TC as expressed in Eq. (5), using R
i
2 and Q
i
2 as in Proposition
3.1, and Ri1 as in Proposition 3.2.
In this scenario, the repayments that allow banks to break even are represented by
R0[(1/λ)+δ+δα(1−λ)/λ], where the third term inside the brackets captures the fact
that untalented entrepreneurs receive financing in the second period with probability
α. This financing is inefficient and it constitutes an adverse selection cost that raises
the repayments that talented entrepreneurs need to make for banks to break even.
Furthermore, the term δb¯/18α(= ∫ π(Ri2−Q
j
2)
0 b(1/b¯)db) captures the switching costs
incurred by talented entrepreneurs.
4 The consequences of information sharing
4.1 Equilibrium under information sharing
Under information sharing, poaching occurs no matter how strong the problem of
adverse selection is. This is so because both banks know all entrepreneurs’ types and
are able to lend only to talented ones. G&S show that the second-period equilibrium
interest rates are:
Rˆi2 = (2b¯ + 3R0)/3π, Qˆi2 = (b¯ + 3R0)/3π, (i = A, B) (6)
regardless of the value of λ [Proposition 4.1 in Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007)]. These
rates imply that a bank’s second-period poaching profits will be (1−μi )(λb¯/9). G&S
also show that, for any λ, the first-period equilibrium interest rates become:
Rˆi1 = (R0 − δλb¯/3)/λπ (7)
and that each bank i’s overall equilibrium profits are:
Gˆi = δ(λb¯/9) > 0 (8)
Since Gi = 0 (Proposition 3.2 above), information sharing increases banks’ profits—
just as it happens in G&S. In the absence of information sharing a bank can obtain
second-period profits only from its first-period borrowers, and these profits are com-
peted away in the first-period. In contrast, under information sharing a bank can obtain
second-period profits on its rival’s customers. The poaching profits that a bank can
obtain, regardless of its first-period customers, constitute “reservation” profits that are
not eliminated in first-period competition.
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The sum of expected repayments and switching costs for talented entrepreneurs
under information sharing
Tˆ C = π Rˆi1 + δE min[π Rˆi2, π Qˆ j2 + b] (9)
can be expressed now [after using Rˆi2 and Qˆ
i
2 in (6) and Rˆ
i
1 in (7)] as follows:
Tˆ C = R0[(1/λ) + δ] + 2δb¯/9 + δb¯/18 (10)
The first of the three terms of Tˆ C captures the repayments that talented entrepre-
neurs have to make for banks to break even. The second termmeasures the repayments
theymake for banks to obtain the profits expressed in Eq. (8). And, finally, the last term
captures the talented entrepreneurs’ expected switching costs, δ
∫ π(Rˆi2−Qˆ j2)
0 b(1/b¯)db= δb¯/18.
To see whether information sharing decreases the lifetime utility of talented entre-
preneurs, we only need to see if it increases their overall debt repayments and switching
expenditures—by comparing TC in (5) with Tˆ C in (10). These entrepreneurs receive
financing regardless of the information sharing regime.
When λ < λ∗,
Tˆ C − T C = 2δb¯/9 + δb¯/18 > 0 (11)
and, therefore, information sharing hurts talented entrepreneurs. There are two reasons
for this to happen, which correspond to the two terms in the RHS in (11). First, infor-
mation sharing increases the talented entrepreneurs’ repayments by 2δb¯/9 to raise
banks’ profits. Second, it also increases switching costs (by δb¯/18) because banks
do not make poaching offers to rival banks’ customers in the absence of information
sharing, but they do make such offers when information is shared.
When λ > λ∗,
Tˆ C − T C = 2δb¯/9 + (−δα(1 − λ)R0/λ) + δb¯(α − 1)/18α (12)
The RHS Eq. (12) captures the three effects that information sharing has on talented
entrepreneurs’ expenditures. The first term is positive and indicates that it increases
their repayments, so that banks’ profits become larger. The second term is negative,
and captures the savings in adverse selection costs that information sharing achieves by
allowing banks to detect untalented entrepreneurs and refrain from lending them. The
third term is also negative and represents the savings that information sharing causes
in switching costs, despite the fact that it does not alter the proportion of talented
entrepreneurs that switch banks, which remains equal to (1/3). Information sharing
achieves these savings because it changes the set of entrepreneurs that switch banks in
a way that their average switching costs are reduced. To see this, notice that, without
information sharing, talented entrepreneurs receive a poaching offer with probability
αand, in such a case, they switch banks if they have a switching cost below the cut-off
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value of π(Ri2 − Q j2) = b¯/3α. In contrast, with information sharing, talented entre-
preneurs always receive a poaching offer. But only those entrepreneurs with switching
costs below the lower cut-off value π(Rˆi2 − Qˆ j2) = b¯/3 will switch banks. The net
effect of the three terms in (Tˆ C − T C) in (12) may be either positive or negative, as
simple calculations (using the fact that δb¯/9α = δα(1 − λ)R0/λ) show:
(Tˆ C − T C) > 0 if and only λ > [81R0/(81R0 + 25b¯)] ≡ λ∗∗.
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4.1 (Equilibrium in period 1) Assume that condition (3) holds and there
is strong adverse selection (λ < R0/(R0 + b¯/9)). Then:
(a) If λ < λ∗, information sharing will increase each bank’s overall profits (by
δ(λb¯/9)), as well as the expected switching costs incurred by talented entrepre-
neurs (by δ(b¯/18)), without altering adverse selection costs–which remain equal
to zero. As a result, information sharing reduces the life-time utility of talented
entrepreneurs.
(b) If λ > λ∗ information sharing will not only increase each bank’s overall profits
(by δ(λb¯/9)), but it will also reduce adverse selection costs (by δα(1−λ)R0) and
the expected switching costs incurred by talented borrowers (by δb¯(1−α)λ/18α).
As a result, information sharing will decrease the life-time utility of talented
entrepreneurs if λ > λ∗∗ and will increase it if λ∗ < λ < λ∗∗.
Remark λ∗ < λ∗∗ if and only if 2b¯ < (9/5)(πv − R0). In such a situation, informa-
tion sharing may or may not hurt talented entrepreneurs. Otherwise, λ∗∗ ≤ λ∗, and
information sharing will always hurt them.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined whether the main result in G&S, the existence of
a conflict of interest between banks and creditworthy entrepreneurs with respect to
information sharing, continues to hold when the economy suffers from strong adverse
selection.
The answer to this question can be presented in two parts. First, we have shown that
theG&S result that information sharing increases banks’ profits, aswell as the intuition
for why it holds, extends to the case of strong adverse selection. In this complementary
situation, a bank has such an informational disadvantage over the characteristics of
its rival’s customers that it cannot obtain positive profits from them in the absence
of information sharing. Thus, a bank obtains profits only on its previous customers.
In a two-period model, first-period competition takes into account such future profits
and eliminates overall rents. In contrast, when there is information sharing, banks
are able to obtain profits from poaching their rival’s customers in the second period.
Importantly, banks can obtain poaching profits even if they do not attract consumers
in the first period. These second-period profits turn out to be “inescapable rents” that
are not competed away in the first period.
Second, with respect to the potential welfare enhancing gains from information
sharing, we have shown that there are two distinct cases to be considered. When the
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proportion of talented entrepreneurs is very low (i.e., λ < λ∗), banks completely
refrain from making poaching offers to their rival’s customers in the absence of infor-
mation sharing. As a result, there are neither unproductive projects being financed,
nor costs from switching banks and, therefore, no gains to be obtained from informa-
tion sharing. The increase in banks’ profits harms talented entrepreneurs. In the other
scenario the proportion of talented entrepreneurs is moderately low (i.e., λ > λ∗), the
second-period equilibrium in the absence of information sharing is inmixed strategies,
with banks making poaching offers to their rival’s customers with positive probability
and some borrowers switching banks. In this case, information sharing eliminates the
financing of unproductive projects and reduces the switching costs incurred by talented
entrepreneurs. Since the amount of these gains may or may not outweigh the increase
in banks’ profits, information sharing may or may not hurt talented entrepreneurs.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
(a) Given that bank j does not offer any poaching rate to bank i’s previous custom-
ers, bank i’s best response is to set Ri2 = v. Conversely, given that bank j offers
a rate R j2 = v to its own previous customers, bank i obtains poaching profits by
offering these customers the poaching rate Qi2. These profits are:
Pi2(Q
i
2, v) = (1 − μi ){λ(π Qi2 − R0) − (1 − λ)R0} if Qi2 ≤ v − b¯/π
(1−μi ){λπ(π Qi2−R0)(v − Qi2)/b¯−(1−λ)R0} if v − b¯/π ≤ Qi2 ≤ v
Maximization of Pi2(Q
i
2, v) with respect to Q
i
2 leads to:
Qi2 = (R0 + πv)/2π if πv − R0 ≤ 2b¯
v − b¯/π if 2b¯ ≤ πv − R0.
Thus, under the assumption that (9/8)(πv − R0) ≤ 2b¯, bank i’s best response
leads to poaching profits equal to
Pi2((R0 + πv)/2π, v) = (1 − μi ){λ(πv − R0)2/4b¯ − (1 − λ)R0} ≤ 0
if and only if λ ≤ λ∗.
Thus, when λ < λ∗, bank i’s best response to R j2 = v is not to offer any poaching
rate.
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(b) Consider now the case λ > λ∗. Clearly, it is not an equilibrium that bank i (i=A,
B) sets Ri2 = v and refrains from offering any poaching rate Qi2 because, given
that the rival bank j sets R j2 = v, bank i can obtain strictly positive poaching
profits.
Consider instead an equilibrium (in mixed strategies) in which bank i offers a rate Ri2
to its previous customers and makes a poaching offer Qi2 to bank j’s customers with
probability α and refrains from making any offer to them with probability (1 − α).
Given R j2 , the poaching profits that bank i obtains with the offer Q
i
2 are:
Pi2(Q
i
2, R
j
2 ) = (1 − μi ){λ(π Qi2 − R0) − (1 − λ)R0} if Qi2 ≤ R j2 − b¯/π
(1 − μi ){λπ(π Qi2 − R0)(R j2 − Qi2)/b¯ − (1 − λ)R0} if R j2 − b¯/π ≤ Qi2 ≤ R j2
(1 − μi ){−(1 − λ)R0} if R j2 ≤ Qi2.
On the other hand, given that bank i sets a poaching rate Qi2 with probability α
and does not poach with probability (1− α), the profits that bank j obtains on its own
customers are:
I j2 (R
j
2 , Q
i
2, α) = μ j
{
α[λ(π R j2 − R0)(b¯ − π(R j2 − Q j2))/b¯]
+(1 − α)[λ(π R j2 − R0)]
}
if Qi2 ≤ R j2 ≤ Qi2 + b¯/π
μ j {(1 − α)[λ(π R j2 − R0)]} if Qi2 + b¯/π ≤ R j2 ≤ v
In equilibrium it is not possible to have Qi2 ≤ R j2 − b¯/π , for these rates imply that,
unless R j2 = v, bank j can increase the profits I j2 (R j2 , Qi2, α) by increasing R j2 . But
if R j2 = v, then bank i can obtain strictly positive poaching profits and therefore, it
will never refrain from making a poaching offer. Also, R j2 ≤ Qi2 is not possible either
because the poaching profits become strictly negative and bank i will not make any
poaching offer at all.
Suppose then that, in equilibrium, R j2 − b¯/π ≤ Qi2 ≤ R j2 . Given R j2 , the optimal
response Qi2 will indeed lie in this segment if and only if 0 ≤ π R j2 − R0 ≤ 2b¯.
In such a case, the poaching profits, Pi2(Q
i
2, R
j
2 ), will reach a maximum of P
i
2 =
λ(π R j2 − R0)2/4b¯ − (1 − λ)R0 when Qi2 = (R0 + π R j2 )/2π . For bank i to be
indifferent between offering this rate and not making any offer, these profits must
be equal to zero, which implies R j2 = [R0 + (4b¯(1 − λ)R0/λ)1/2]/π and, therefore,
Qi2 = [R0 + (b¯(1 − λ)R0/λ)1/2]/π . It is easy to check that given this value of R j2 ,
0 ≤ π R j2 − R0 ≤ 2b¯ is indeed satisfied when λ > λ∗.
Consider now the optimality of bank j’s offer, R j2 . The function I
j
2 (R
j
2 , Q
i
2, α)
is non-concave in R j2 . In the segment Q
i
2 + b¯/π ≤ R j2 ≤ v, it reaches a maxi-
mum at R j2 = v, whereas in the segment Qi2 ≤ R j2 ≤ Qi2 + b¯/π , it does so when
α[−2π R j2 + R0 + b¯ + π Qi2]/b¯ + (1 − α) = 0.
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By replacing R j2 = [R0 + (4b¯(1 − λ)R0/λ)1/2]/π and Qi2 = [R0 + (b¯(1 −
λ)R0/λ)1/2]/π in this condition, we obtain α = [b¯λ/9(1 − λ)R0]1/2. Therefore, it is
necessary that α, R j2 , and Q
i
2 take precisely these values to have a mixed equilibrium
as stated above. On the other hand, given that α and Qi2 take these values, a comparison
of the two local maxima of the function I j2 (R
j
2 , Q
i
2, α) shows that the global maxima
is indeed interior if and only if α(1 − α)(πv − R0) ≤ 4b¯/9, which holds under the
condition (9/8)(πv − R0) ≤ 2b¯.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
(a) Consider first the case λ < λ∗. It is an equilibrium that both banks charge the
interest rate R∗1 = [R0 − δλ(πv − R0)]/λπ : by replacing Ri1 with R∗1 in (4) and
using Gi2 = μiλ(πv − R0), we see that this rate leads to bank i’s overall profits
Gi = 0. Given bank j’s choice of R∗1 , if bank i charges an interest rate above
R∗1 , it will attract no consumers and, therefore, it will earn zero profits. If, on the
other hand, bank i charges an interest rate below R∗1 , it will attract all consumers.
By replacing such a value in (4) we obtain that overall profits are negative. Thus,
no bank can increase its profits by unilaterally charging a different interest rate.
We now show that there is no other equilibrium. Suppose first that banks charge
different interest rates, R∗1 ≤ R j1 < Ri1. Since bank j can raise its interest rate
and still attract all consumers—as long as it keeps the rate below Ri1—and thus
earn higher profits, this cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose instead that banks
charge the same interest rates R∗1 < Ri1 = R j1 . Then bank i will attract a fraction
μi of the consumers and will earn positive profits on them. If bank i reduces
its interest rate in an infinitesimal amount, its profits on these consumers will
accordingly be reduced in an infinitesimal amount. On the other hand, it will
now attract the remainder (1− μi ) consumers and earn positive profits on them.
Thus, bank i’s profits will be higher, showing that we do not have an equilibrium.
Finally, notice that, since negative profits can be avoided by charging R∗1 , it is
not an equilibrium to have a bank charging an interest rate below R∗1 to attract
consumers.
(b) The analysis of the case λ > λ∗∗ only differs from the previous one in the fact
that now Gi2 = μiλ(4b¯/9α).
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